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abstract: Most examples of cooperation in nature share a common
feature: individuals can interact to produce a productivity benefit or
fitness surplus, but there is conflict over how these gains are shared.
A central question is how threats to exercise outside options influence
the resolution of conflict within such cooperative associations. Here
we show how a simple principle from economic bargaining theory,
the outside option principle, can help to solve this problem in bi-
ological systems. According to this principle, outside options will
affect the resolution of conflict only when the payoff of taking up
these options exceeds the payoffs individuals can obtain from bar-
gaining or negotiating within the group; otherwise, threats to exercise
outside options are not credible and are therefore irrelevant. We show
that previous attempts to incorporate outside options in synthetic
models of reproductive conflict fail to distinguish between credible
and incredible threats, and then we use the outside option principle
to develop credible synthetic models in two contexts: reproductive
skew and biparental care. A striking prediction of our analysis is that
outside options are least relevant to the resolution of conflict in
cooperative groups of kin and are most relevant in transient asso-
ciations or interactions among nonrelatives. Our analysis shows a
way to link the resolution of within-group conflict to the environ-
mental setting in which it occurs, and it illuminates the role of threats
in the evolution of social behavior.
Keywords: reproductive skew, cooperation, biparental care, mu-
tualism.
Introduction
In many situations in nature, two or more individuals can
cooperate to produce mutual fitness benefits, but there
exists conflict over how the benefits of cooperation are
shared. Cooperatively breeding species, for example, can
together produce more young than can solitary breeders,
but within groups, individuals compete to monopolize re-
production (Keller and Reeve 1994; Clutton-Brock 1998;
Johnstone 2000; Reeve and Keller 2001; Magrath et al.
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2004; Cant 2006). In biparental care systems and inter-
specific mutualisms, individuals can gain from coordinated
action, but each would prefer to reap the maximum return
benefit from the minimum investment in the interaction
(Trivers 1971; Houston and Davies 1985; Bull and Rice
1991; McNamara et al. 1999; West et al. 2002; Sachs et al.
2004; Foster and Wenseleers 2006; Johnstone and Hinde
2006). The way in which such conflicts are resolved is
expected to influence individual behavior, group-level
characteristics, and the ease with which cooperative as-
sociations form. Consequently, understanding the prin-
ciples of conflict resolution is a major focus of research
on social evolution (Alexander 1987; Noe¨ and Hammer-
stein 1994, 1995; Godfray 1995; Reeve 2000; Frank 2003;
Cant 2006; Ratnieks et al. 2006).
An outstanding question is how the availability of out-
side options, such as leaving to seek partners elsewhere or
evicting others from the group, affects the stability of co-
operative groups and the evenness of profit sharing. To
address this question requires an approach that links
within-group conflict to the ecological and social envi-
ronment in which it occurs. This link is usually missing,
however, from traditional “forced play” models of coop-
eration in which the probability of repeated encounter is
assigned exogenously to the model and individuals cannot
choose to exit an interaction in response to defection (Ax-
elrod and Hamilton 1981; Nowak and Sigmund 1992,
1993). By contrast, the link to the setting of an interaction
is central to models of reproductive skew, which explore
conflict over reproduction in cooperative societies (Veh-
rencamp 1983; Reeve and Ratnieks 1993; Johnstone 2000;
Reeve and Shen 2006), and to the theory of biological
markets (Noe¨ et al. 1991; Noe¨ and Hammerstein 1994;
Bshary and Noe¨ 2003). Reproductive skew models, in par-
ticular, have sought to clarify the role of outside options
in conflict resolution, and so are a useful starting point
in the search for general principles that can be applied to
other forms of cooperation such as biparental care and
mutualism.
Two main types of skew model have been proposed to
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Figure 1: Graphical model of conflict resolution. a, Simple bargaining situation in which neither player has an outside option and negotiation is
cost free. The shaded area is the set of possible outcomes from the negotiation. Resolution at point R represents a case where player 2 has greater
bargaining power than player 1; resolution at point S represents the case where the reverse is true. b, Example with outside options. Players 1 and
2 have outside options of values uX and , respectively, represented by a single point X. In addition, in this case we assume that the negotiationvX
process is costly, reducing the total fitness that can be realized through cooperation by a factor c ( ). Where player 2 has greater bargainingc ! 1
power than player 1, the resolution at R results in a higher payoff for both players than their outside option, so in this case neither player’s threat
to exercise their outside options is credible. Where player 1 has greater bargaining power, resolution at point S results in a payoff for player 2′v
that is less than their outside option payoff , so player 2’s threat to exercise their outside option is credible. In this case, player 1’s best option isvX
to allow a shift along the line of efficient outcomes to point S∗, at which point player 2’s threat is no longer credible.
explain variation in the distribution of reproduction within
groups. Transactional models (Vehrencamp 1983; Reeve
1991; Johnstone and Cant 1999; Reeve 2000; Buston et al.
2007) assume two-player cooperative associations in which
one player (the allocator; Buston et al. 2007) can choose
how productivity is shared but the other player can
threaten to break up the association (by leaving or evicting
its partner) unless offered a large enough share. Trans-
actional models, therefore, assume that the level of skew
in a stable group is determined by the inclusive fitness
value, to the nonallocating player, of exercising this threat.
By contrast, compromise models ignore the possibility of
outside options and focus instead on how conflict is re-
solved when both parties exert partial, costly control over
the outcome, for example, via a tug-of-war over repro-
ductive shares (Reeve et al. 1998) or a competition to
produce the most young (Cant 1998; Cant and Johnstone
1999). Thus, we have a battleground of conflict (Godfray
1991), the boundaries of which are defined by the payoffs
to the two players of pursuing alternative, noncooperative
strategies, and we also have some candidate models to
explore how conflict within this battleground is resolved
(Cant 2006). However, does the location of the boundaries
influence the resolution of conflict within them? While
there have been several attempts to synthesize skew models
in order to answer this question, there is still little agree-
ment as to which approach is appropriate (Johnstone 2000;
Reeve and Shen 2006; Nonacs 2007).
A possible solution to this problem can be gleaned from
work in economic bargaining theory, which is concerned
with problems that are structurally very similar to ours
(Nash 1950; Osborne and Rubinstein 1990; Muthoo 1999).
In economics, a bargaining situation is one in which two
or more players have a common interest in cooperation,
but they disagree over how the profits of cooperation
should be distributed. An obvious example is trade, al-
though formally similar problems arise in a range of other
contexts, from salary negotiations and litigation to military
disputes between nation states (Fearon 1995; Powell 1996,
2002; Reiter 2003). There is a large literature on bargain-
ing, which we do not attempt to review here; readers seek-
ing an accessible introduction are directed to Muthoo
(1999, 2000). Rather, we borrow a graphical model from
this literature and use it to show how a simple principle
of bargaining theory, the outside option principle (Bin-
more 1985; Sutton 1986; Binmore et al. 1989), can help
to solve the problem of how to synthesize models of re-
productive skew and illuminate the role of threats in the
resolution of evolutionary conflict in other contexts such
as biparental care and mutualism.
A Graphical Model of Conflict Resolution
Bargaining situations can be represented in a convenient
graphical form (Nash 1950, 1953; Osborne and Rubinstein
1990; Powell 2002). This graphical model is a useful tool
to help understand and visualize how social conflicts are
resolved. In figure 1a, we plot the potential fitness out-
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comes of an interaction between two individuals—player
1 and player 2—who can cooperate in some way to pro-
duce a fitness surplus. We will assume for simplicity’s sake
that the two players are unrelated, and we plot the direct
fitness payoffs of the two players along orthogonal axes
denoted u and , respectively. The set of possible directv
fitness outcomes from the interaction is shown as the
shaded region in figure 1a. Note that the model can be
applied equally well to interactions among individuals of
symmetrical or asymmetrical relatedness: in this case, we
would plot inclusive fitness, rather than direct fitness,
along the orthogonal axes, and the shaded area would
represent the paired inclusive fitness outcomes of an in-
teraction. The graphical approach might also be extended
to three players by adding a third axis, the z-axis; the set
of possible fitness outcomes would then be represented as
a solid in three dimensions.
If the players choose not to cooperate, or if they cannot
agree on coordinated action, we assume that they both re-
ceive a fitness payoff of 0. We assume in all figures that the
maximum total fitness (or surplus) achievable by interaction
is equal to a constant k, so that the boundary of the set
fitness outcomes is linear. The boundary defines “efficient”
outcomes, that is, outcomes at which a player can increase
its own payoff only at the expense of the other player. We
define a conflict as resolved when neither player can gain
from further attempts to influence the outcome; that is, the
outcome is efficient and in equilibrium.
The expected efficient resolution within the set of pos-
sible fitness outcomes depends on the rules governing the
bargaining or negotiation process and the relative attri-
butes of the players. Let us assume initially that the ne-
gotiation involves no personal or group costs. If player 1
can make offers of a division of the surplus that player 2
can only accept or reject, then the problem takes the form
of an “ultimatum game” (Guth et al. 1982). Accordingly,
we expect the resolution at A; that is, we expect player 1
to claim all of the available fitness (i.e., k units) and leave
player 2 with a share that is infinitesimally greater than 0
(or with the smallest allocatable unit of fitness). Likewise,
if player 2 makes offers that player 1 can only accept or
reject, we expect a resolution at B. The two resolution
points at R and S correspond to cases where both players
can exert partial influence over the outcome, but the play-
ers differ in some way in their “bargaining power,” that
is, in their effectiveness at negotiating toward their favored
resolution. Resolution R (at which the two players receive
payoffs u1 and , respectively) represents the case whenv1
player 2 exerts greater influence over the outcome of bar-
gaining than player 1; S represents the resolution when
the opposite is true. In biological systems, differences in
bargaining power will arise when players differ in the fit-
ness costs they experience during negotiation (e.g., when
this involves physical risk or display costs) or in their
sensitivities to delay (e.g., where there are time constraints
to realize the gains of cooperation). Bargaining power is
therefore a relative measure of the fitness costs paid to
achieve a given share of the productivity surplus of the
association. Where interactants are related, the two players’
inclusive fitness costs of bargaining will be correlated, and
increasing relatedness is expected to reduce the impact of
underlying asymmetries in bargaining power. Where re-
latedness is asymmetrical (e.g., in social Hymenoptera),
the less related party will possess greater effective bar-
gaining power (other things being equal) because it is less
sensitive to the costs it inflicts on the other player.
The Outside Option Principle
Our aim is to determine how the presence of outside op-
tions influences the resolution of conflict. Figure 1b sug-
gests a simple solution to this problem. In this figure, we
again consider two cases that depend on whether player
1 or player 2 is the stronger bargainer. Additionally, in this
figure we assume that negotiation is costly in that some
of the realizable fitness surplus is used up in the negotiating
process; specifically, during negotiation, maximum total
fitness is reduced by some constant factor c (!1; in reality,
c may itself vary with the characteristics of the bargainers,
such as relative bargaining power or relatedness). The out-
side options available to the players are represented by a
single point X, which gives the fitness payoffs of the two
players if either one chooses to break up the association.
When player 2 is stronger than player 1, the process of
negotiation leads to an efficient resolution at point R. At
this resolution point, both players receive a greater payoff
than they would get if either was to exercise the outside
option. Thus, in this case, a threat by either party to exert
the outside option is not credible in the sense that, having
reached this point in the game, it would not pay for them
to do so (Nash 1953; McNamara and Houston 2002).
Consequently, the presence of the outside option makes
no difference to the resolution of the conflict.
In the case where player 1 is stronger than player 2,
negotiation leads to an efficient resolution at point S. How-
ever, player 2’s payoff at point S is lower than its outside
option payoff, so player 2’s threat to exert its outside op-
tion is credible. Deterring player 2 from exercising this
outside option is very much in player 1’s interest (because
), so player 1 will gain from permitting a shift in′u 1 u X
the division of the surplus along the line of efficiency to
point S∗, which yields a payoff for player 2 that is just
equal to its outside option. The outside option in this case
clearly does affect the outcome of the negotiation process.
In summary, the graphical model suggests that a focal
individual’s outside option will influence the resolution of
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Figure 2: Graphical representations of previous synthetic models of reproductive skew. a, Johnstone (2000) assumes that both players concede
sufficient reproduction to each other to render outside option threats incredible before engaging in costly bargaining. b, Reeve and Shen (2006)
assume that at equilibrium, players use a combination of concessions and competitive efforts such that both receive their outside option payoffs
and all the remaining surplus is used up in competition.
within-group conflict, but only if this option yields a
greater payoff to the focal individual than the payoff it
expects to receive through negotiation (Nash 1953; Bin-
more 1985; Binmore et al. 1989). In these circumstances,
the focal individual can use a credible threat to exercise
its outside option to obtain a more favorable resolution,
one that is sufficient to render the threat incredible (this
conclusion was also reached independently by Buston and
Zink [2009]). In economics, this simple result has been
called the outside option principle (Sutton 1986; Muthoo
1999, 2000). In pairwise interactions, only one player’s
threat to exercise an outside option can be credible at a
time. In larger groups, however, two or more players may
simultaneously exercise credible threats to extract a greater
share of resources from the others (Raiffa 2005).
Previous Attempts at Synthesis
How does this analysis compare with previous attempts
to determine the role of outside options in the resolution
of evolutionary conflict? There have been two such at-
tempts to produce a synthetic model of within-group con-
flict, each in the context of reproductive skew.
Johnstone (2000) first attempted to incorporate outside
options and incomplete control (or bargaining) in a single
framework. He considered conflict over reproduction be-
tween a dominant individual and a subordinate individual
in a cooperative association who were symmetrically re-
lated by coefficient r (the same analysis can be applied to
cases of asymmetric relatedness, although this was not
explored in Johnstone’s [2000] article). In this model, the
two individuals can together generate a maximum pro-
ductivity k relative to a lone breeder (for concreteness, one
can think of k as the number of surviving offspring pro-
duced per time unit). The dominant and subordinate both
possess outside options such that they require fractions Q
and P, respectively, of this total productivity to make stay-
ing in the group worthwhile. In the first step of the game,
the two players concede these fractions to each other so
that the association is stable. They then compete for the
remaining contested productivity via a costly tug-of-war
in which both players invest selfish effort to obtain a
greater share of it at a cost to the total productivity to be
shared. A graphical representation of the model is shown
in figure 2a.
A problem with this approach is that the minimum frac-
tions P and Q that are set aside in the first step in order to
guarantee group stability are calculated on the basis of total
productivity k, overlooking the fact that some of this pro-
ductivity will be used up in the costly tug-of-war in the
second step. After a tug-of-war, these shares are no longer
sufficient to ensure group stability. The model of Reeve and
Shen (2006) attempted to address this problem using an
alternative approach. Again, they assumed that two players,
a dominant and a subordinate, engage in a game in which
each can choose two quantities: the fraction they each set
aside as a concession to the other (denoted P and Q, re-
spectively) and the effort they expend in a tug-of-war over
the remainder (denoted x and y, respectively). However, in
this case, the authors assume that an evolutionarily stable
outcome is reached when two simultaneous conditions hold:
(1) each player receives an inclusive fitness payoff equal to
the player’s outside option and (2) each player’s selfish effort
is a best response to the other’s (i.e., selfish efforts are at a
Nash equilibrium). These two conditions can hold only at
a single point in the set of possible outcomes represented
Threats and Conflict Resolution 000
in figure 2b: the point represented by the outside option
point X (if the players are related, the point X represents
the single point in inclusive fitness space of the two players).
Consequently, at the solution obtained by Reeve and Shen
(2006), the players use up all of the potential benefits of
group membership in the process of finding a resolution
(Nonacs 2007). The two solution conditions of Reeve and
Shen’s (2006) model force a resolution at which each player
gives away a free share of reproduction to their opponent
but at the same time fights hard for the remainder. Intui-
tively, it would make more sense for the players to reduce
the size of the free share offered to their partner and invest
less effort in wasteful competition. This intuition is borne
out; in the appendix, we show that no stable solution is
possible when a player offers a concession while simulta-
neously fighting over the contested share of reproduction.
A similar conclusion has been reached by authors mod-
eling within-group conflict in other contexts. For example,
Gardner et al. (2007) developed a model of sex ratio con-
flict in parasitoid polyembryonic wasps in which (haploid)
males prefer a less female-biased sex ratio than their dip-
loid sisters. In these species, a fraction of larvae develop
precociously as soldiers, giving up their own future re-
production in order to kill competitors (including opposite
sex siblings) developing in the same host (Gardner et al.
2007). In this case (and in the begging models of Godfray
1991, 1995), the battleground of conflict is defined by the
males’ and females’ different optima (i.e., by optimization
constraints, as opposed to by the group stability constraints
that define the battleground in transactional skew models;
Cant 2006). Male offspring can allocate a free handout to
their sisters (by limiting their clonal proliferation in a host)
or engage in costly competition akin to the tug-of-war (by
increasing the proportion of clones that develop as sol-
diers). Gardner et al. (2007) show that male offspring are
never favored to offer a free handout to females while at
the same time engaging in costly conflict, as is expected
from the proof we present in the appendix.
Both previous attempts to produce a synthetic model
of reproductive skew, therefore, face strong theoretical ob-
jections. These models have also been forcefully critiqued
by Nonacs (2007), who highlights some of the same prob-
lems pointed out here (however, the simulation model
offered by Nonacs [2007] does not include outside options
and so does not solve the problem of how to synthesize
skew models). In the next section, we show how the out-
side option principle helps to resolve the problems faced
by previous models and illustrate the wider applicability
of this principle by outlining credible synthetic models of
within-group conflict in two contexts: conflict over re-
production in cooperative breeders and conflict over in-
vestment in young in biparental care systems.
Credible Synthetic Models
Reproductive Skew
How can we construct a synthetic model of reproductive
skew that corresponds to the graphical model shown in
figure 1b and consequently avoids the problems encoun-
tered by previous analyses? Like previous analyses, we will
consider groups composed of a dominant individual and
a subordinate individual who are symmetrically related by
r. For simplicity’s sake, we assume that the dominant’s
only outside option is to evict the subordinate (at no cost);
in this case, the dominant’s direct fitness payoff as a sole
breeder on the patch is standardized at 1 (it would be
simple to incorporate a cost of eviction or to assume that
dominants could also choose to leave). The subordinate’s
outside option is to disperse to breed independently; from
this, it can expect direct fitness payoff X (!1). The two
players engage in a tug-of-war over reproduction in the
group, but they adjust their efforts if outside options be-
come relevant during the bargaining process.
In the tug-of-war game, the dominant can invest any
fraction x and the subordinate can invest any fraction y
of the remaining group productivity in an effort to max-
imize their inclusive fitness. The dominant thereby obtains
a share and the subordinate obtains a sharex/(x by)
of total productivity . The inclu-by/(x by) k(1 x y)
sive fitness payoffs of the dominant and subordinate from
a tug-of-war in the absence of outside options are, re-
spectively:
x by
I p k(1 x y)  r , (1)d ( )x by x by
by x
I p k(1 x y)  r , (2)s ( )x by x by
where the parameter b measures the relative strength or
efficiency of the subordinate.
For any given effort x by the dominant, there is a best
response function for the subordinate, , which is foundyˆ(x)
by solving . Similarly, for any effort y by theI /yp 0s
subordinate, there is a best response function for the dom-
inant, , which is found by solving . Thexˆ(y) I /xp 0d
stable Nash equilibrium solution (which we will denote
(x∗, y∗)) is where the players’ effort levels are best responses
to each other; that is, . At this equilibrium, theˆ ˆx(y)p y(x)
dominant and subordinate receive payoffs ∗I pd
and , respectively. Whether the∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗I (x , y ) I p I (x , y )d s s
presence of outside options will affect the outcome of
bargaining depends on the magnitude of , and the∗ ∗I Id s
value of the subordinate’s outside option X. There are four
possibilities, which we consider in turn.
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No Concessions. If both players obtain greater payoffs from
the tug-of-war than they can expect to get from pursuing
their outside options, the outside options are irrelevant.
That is, where
∗ ∗I (x , y ) 1 1 rX, (3)d
∗ ∗I (x , y ) 1 X r, (4)s
the outcome is that of the simple tug-of-war. We label this
zone of parameter space “no concessions” because neither
player needs to take into account the outside options of
the other when deciding on its own optimal effort in the
tug-of-war.
Dominant Yields a Concession. Where
∗ ∗I (x , y ) 1 1 rX, (5)d
∗ ∗I (x , y ) ! X r, (6)s
the subordinate will favor dispersal over staying, whereas
the dominant will favor maintaining the association. In
this region, the dominant must ease off in the tug-of-war
(what we will term “granting a concession”) if it is to
retain the subordinate in the group. Specifically, the dom-
inant should invest at a level x ′ such that
′ ′
ˆI (x , y(x ))p X r.s
To find the stable best efforts in this region, we set ex-
pression (2) equal to , solve for x to yield a functionX r
x ′, and substitute this in place of x into our expression
for . After rearranging, we can solve for y to find theyˆ(x)
best response effort of the subordinate , given that′yˆ(x )
the dominant invests effort x ′. The dominant will favor
investing at the lower level x ′ so long as
′ ′
ˆI (x , y(x )) 1 1 rX. (7)d
If this inequality is not satisfied, the group will break up
because the dominant will not be selected to reduce its
competitive effort in the tug-of-war and the subordinate
will disperse. Thus, the “dominant yields a concession”
zone is defined as that for which conditions (5), (6), and
(7) hold.
Subordinate Yields a Concession. Where
∗ ∗I (x , y ) ! 1 rX, (8)d
∗ ∗I (x , y ) 1 X r, (9)s
the dominant will favor evicting the subordinate and the
subordinate will favor remaining in the group. To avoid
eviction, the subordinate must therefore ease off in the
tug-of-war. Specifically, the subordinate must invest at
level y ′, which satisfies
′ ′
ˆI (x(y ), y )p 1 rX,d
where is the best response of the dominant when′xˆ(y )
the subordinate invests at level y ′. The subordinate will
favor investing at this lower level y ′ so long as
′ ′
ˆI (x(y ), y ) 1 X r. (10)s
If condition (10) does not hold, the subordinate will not
be favored to ease off and so will be evicted (because we
assume no cost of eviction, this would be observationally
indistinguishable from voluntary dispersal by the subor-
dinate). Together, conditions (8), (9), and (10) define the
“subordinate yields a concession” (or subordinate re-
straint) zone.
Group Breaks Up. Finally, as described, where both players’
outside options exceed their payoff from the tug-of-war
(i.e., neither condition [3] nor condition [4] holds) or
where one player requires a concession to favor keeping
the group intact but it does not pay the other individual
to grant this concession (i.e., conditions [5] and [6] hold
but not condition [7], or conditions [8] and [9] hold but
not condition [10]), then the subordinate will leave or be
thrown out and the group will break up.
We have derived analytical solutions for the boundaries
of the regions of parameter space that correspond to the
four outcomes described above. Because these expressions
are in some cases complex, we will not give them here;
instead, figure 3 graphically shows these regions of param-
eter space for the cases of unrelated ( ) and relatedrp 0
( ) competitors. The general qualitative pattern isrp 0.5
simple: groups are more likely to break up when produc-
tivity (k) is low, the subordinate’s opportunity for inde-
pendent breeding (X) is great, and competitors are less
closely related. There is a substantial region in which both
the threat of departure and the threat of eviction prove to
be incredible, so that the solution of the basic tug-of-war
game is stable and unaffected by outside options. This
outcome is most likely when group productivity is high,
there is little opportunity for independent breeding, and
competitors are more closely related. When the subordi-
nate is much weaker than the dominant, and particularly
when there are substantial opportunities for independent
breeding and the competitors are unrelated, the threat of
subordinate departure becomes credible and the dominant
must ease off in competition to retain the subordinate in
the group. Conversely, when the subordinate is not too
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Figure 3: Results of a “credible” synthetic model of reproductive skew that takes into account the outside option principle. Zones of stability are
shown as a function of relative subordinate strength b and the productivity benefits of association k (relative to that of a solitary breeder). a,
Dominant and subordinate individuals are unrelated. b, Dominant and subordinate individuals are related by coefficient 0.5. Each panel shows two
plots that differ in the probability of successful dispersal for the subordinate d.
much weaker than the dominant, when there are sub-
stantial opportunities for independent breeding, and when
the competitors are unrelated, the subordinate may have
to ease off in competition for its presence to be tolerated.
Biparental Care
The same method can be used to incorporate outside op-
tions into models of evolutionary conflict in other con-
texts, for example, biparental care systems of the kind
modeled by Houston and Davies (1985) and McNamara
et al. (1999, 2003).
Consider two parents, a male and a female, who can
choose to invest in their brood at levels m and f, at a cost
to their future fitness of Cm(m) and Cf( f ), respectively
(where , ; , ). We2 2 2 2C /m C /f 1 0  C /m  C /f ≥ 0m f m f
assume for simplicity’s sake that there is no extra-pair
paternity. The total number of surviving young is an in-
creasing, decelerating function of total investment t
( ; , ). Thus, male and female2 2tp m f B/t 1 0  B/t ! 0
fitness is given by
B(m f )
W (m, f )p  C (m), (11)m m2
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Figure 4: Biparental care when males may exert a credible threat to desert. a, Zones of stability as a function of the relative cost of male care and
the value of the male’s outside option. Results are shown for a model in which male and female fitness functions take a simple quadratic form
(specifically, ; ; ). b, Evolutionarily stable levels of parental effort for males and females for a single slice2 2 2Bp (m f) (m f) C p cm C p fm f
through this parameter space (shown as a short vertical line in a). In this example, we assume that investment is costlier for females, so females
initially invest at lower levels than males ( ). However, where the male’s threat to depart is credible, the female may be selected to work∗ ∗f ! m
harder (at rate f ′) so that the male’s optimum effort is lowered (to m′) and he continues to favor staying in the partnership. However, where the
male’s outside option is more profitable, the extra investment required to keep the male in the partnership is not worth it for the female, so she
favors allowing the male to leave and switching to the optimum work rate as the sole carer ( ).∗f0
B(m f )
W (m, f )p  C (f ). (12)f f2
For any given female effort f, there will be a best effort for
the male to invest , which is found by solvingmˆ(f )
. Similarly, for any given male effort m, thereW /mp 0m
will be a best effort for the female, which is found by solving
. If the fitness functions (11) and (12) are suchW /fp 0f
that both and are negative and of mag-ˆˆm(f )/f f (m)/m
nitude !1, there may exist a stable Nash equilibrium at
which both parents invest nonzero effort (m∗, f∗).
To introduce outside options in a simple way, we will
assume that only males have the option to desert to look
for breeding opportunities elsewhere (although the anal-
ysis could easily be extended to allow both parties the
opportunity to desert). If the male deserts, he can gain
the expected payoff Xm elsewhere (reflecting mating op-
portunities outside the partnership), while the female gains
the expected payoff
∗B(f )0 ∗X p  C (f ),f f 02
where is the optimum investment of the female given∗f0
(i.e., the male deserts). In the region wheremp 0
, the presence of the desertion option∗ ∗W (m , f ) 1 Xm m
does not influence the best efforts of the male and female.
However, if , the female needs to work∗ ∗W (m , f ) ! Xm m
at a higher rate f ′ to retain the male, such that
′ ′
ˆW (m(f ), f )p X .m m
The female will favor working at this higher rate so long as
′ ′
ˆW (m(f ), f ) 1 X .f f
If this inequality is not satisfied, the female will favor
switching to working at the lone breeder optimum rate,
, forcing the male to disperse.∗f0
We have obtained analytical results for this model as-
suming that the fitness functions take a simple quadratic
form. The results are presented graphically in figure 4a,
which shows the three zones where the male’s threat to
leave is incredible, where it is credible, and where the
partnership breaks up. Figure 4b shows the levels of in-
vestment for a particular value of the males outside option
Xm. Where the outside option of the male is of relatively
low value, the male’s threat to leave is incredible and so
it exerts no influence on the evolutionarily stable levels of
investment for the male and female. When the outside
option of the male is of high value, the female does her
best to allow the male to depart and to raise the brood
on her own rather than working harder to induce the male
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to stay. In between, there is a region for which the male’s
threat to leave is credible and the female does her best to
work harder to keep the male in the group. Interestingly,
in some cases, the female ends up working harder than
she would if she were raising the brood on her own. This
result arises because in a partnership, the female can share
the costs of total investment with the male even if she
ends up paying a disproportionate share of these costs.
Discussion
Outside Options and Conflict Resolution
The question we have considered is whether the presence
of outside options should influence the resolution of con-
flict in cooperative associations. The answer according to
our analysis is yes, but only under certain circumstances.
Outside options are irrelevant when negotiation yields a
higher payoff to both players than they could expect from
pursuing their outside option. The role of outside options,
therefore, depends on the balance between the payoffs
obtained by negotiation and those obtained by carrying
out a threat.
A striking prediction of our analysis of reproductive
conflict is that outside options will be least relevant where
group members are close relatives and the productivity
benefits of association are high: precisely, those situations
where selection is most likely to favor cooperation in the
first place (e.g., in cooperatively breeding insects and ver-
tebrates) and to which reproductive skew models are most
often applied. Threats to exercise outside options are less
likely to be credible in these circumstances because alter-
natives outside the group are less profitable. This may
explain why the two studies of cooperative breeders that
manipulated ecological constraints experimentally (Langer
et al. 2004; Heg et al. 2006) found no effect on reproductive
sharing. Outside options should play a more important
role where individuals are not tightly bound by kinship,
where the productivity benefits of association are low, and
where it is relatively easy to recruit alternative partners.
These conditions may apply best to social groups in which
group members contribute little to productivity (e.g.,
coral-dwelling fish; Buston 2003; Wong et al. 2007), to
facultative or short-term cooperative associations (e.g., co-
alitions or alliances: Russell 1983; Zabel et al. 1992; Connor
et al. 1999; Silk et al. 2004; grooming relationships: Barrett
et al. 1999; Schino 2007), and to some interspecific mu-
tualisms (e.g., Bshary and Grutter 2005). Consequently,
we expect manipulation of outside options to have a
greater effect on the partitioning of productivity (and levels
of cooperation) in these contexts.
What decides the payoffs of bargaining versus exercising
an outside option? In a biological context, bargaining or
negotiation can be thought of as any interaction or be-
havioral process by which animals with conflicting inter-
ests can reach a compromise settlement (or stable behav-
ioral equilibrium) without breaking up the association or
resorting to an all-out fight. This may involve the exchange
of signals or displays, physical aggression, or other at-
tempts to control resources. In many cases, the details of
the negotiation process will be unclear. Nevertheless, we
can expect an individual’s bargaining power to depend (as
it does in economics) on its ability to sustain costs or
inflict them on its partner during the negotiation process
and on its sensitivity to delay in reaching a settlement.
Bargaining power in nature, therefore, will typically cor-
relate with relative quality, fighting ability or strength, or
access to group resources. Bargaining power is not ex-
pected to depend on the availability of options outside the
group.
By contrast, the payoffs associated with outside options
will depend primarily on what can be termed “market
forces”—the quality and availability of alternative partners
or vacancies in the wider population—rather than on in-
dividual attributes of the bargainers (although these at-
tributes may also affect the value of outside options; this
is especially likely in the special case where the outside
option is to enter into an escalated fight). Where individ-
uals can readily terminate an interaction and recruit a new
partner, threats of departure and eviction will often be
credible and so may influence the outcome of negotiation
in a way that overrides differences in relative bargaining
power. The power of such sanctions has been the focus
of much discussion in the literature on mutualisms (Herre
et al. 1999; Denison 2000; Ferriere et al. 2002; West et al.
2002; Kiers et al. 2003; Sachs et al. 2004; Foster and Wen-
seleers 2006) and biological markets (Noe¨ and Hammer-
stein 1994, 1995; Noe¨ 2001; Johnstone and Bshary 2002;
Bshary and Noe¨ 2003). These models suggest that the level
of cooperation will depend on the quality and availability
of partners (partner choice) and the ability to coerce or
compete within partnerships (partner control; Noe¨ and
Hammerstein 1994), which is equivalent to the distinction
in our analysis between resolution according to outside
options versus bargaining power. The outside option prin-
ciple thus suggests a simple rule to integrate these two
types of model: partner choice will affect partner control
if and only if the threat to swap partners is credible.
Signaling of Threats
The outside option principle is useful in clarifying the way
threats can be used to influence social behavior. In our
analysis, we have focused on the threat of departure or
eviction from the group, but the same principle holds for
other types of threat such as that of escalated fighting
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(another type of outside option). In a cooperative asso-
ciation, each player has a strong incentive to avoid trig-
gering a threat because doing so entails a sudden drop in
their own fitness. A threat threshold represents a fitness
“cliff edge” for the recipient of the threat (Kokko 2003),
so we should expect strong selection on organisms to ex-
ercise restraint to avoid triggering threats. In our models,
this presents no difficulty because both parties know where
threat thresholds lie and whether threats are credible. In
reality, however, there will almost always be some uncer-
tainty about the availability of outside options and the
costs and benefits of triggering a threat. Threats are cred-
ible only if they are perceived as such by the other player,
so information is a crucial determinant of whether threats
will influence social behavior. How might information
about threats be acquired or conveyed?
In repeated interactions (with the same or multiple part-
ners), individuals might gain information about the lo-
cation of threat thresholds and the credibility of threats
through trial-and-error learning (Clutton-Brock and Par-
ker 1995). Alternatively, group members could commu-
nicate so as to avoid triggering a threat. However, here
there is considerable scope for conflict and deception be-
cause an exploiting individual will benefit from knowing
exactly where their partner’s threat threshold lies, while
the partner will benefit from misrepresenting or concealing
the location of their threshold. For example, it may pay
subordinate individuals in a dominance hierarchy to con-
ceal their ability or motivation to challenge those of higher
rank. In the case of dominance interactions of Polistes
wasps, subordinates freeze their position and lower their
head and antennae as dominants antennate and mount
them (Gamboa et al. 1990). Such submissive behavior
probably yields little information about the subordinate’s
fighting ability or aggressive motivation. By contrast, in
the cooperatively breeding cichlid Neolamprologus pulcher,
subordinate individuals engage in energetically costly sub-
missive behavior toward dominants that might yield re-
liable information about their relative fighting ability or
quality (Grantner and Taborsky 1998; see also Kutsukake
and Clutton-Brock 2006 for an example of active sub-
mission in meerkats). A better understanding of threat
signaling might therefore cast light on the variety of dom-
inance-submission behaviors that are a conspicuous fea-
ture of animal dominance hierarchies.
Where it pays a threatening individual to signal the
location of its threat threshold, there is a clear incentive
for deception because signalers gain from exaggerating
their willingness to exercise a threat. Signals aimed at con-
veying an imminent threat will therefore lack credibility
unless they are costly in some way (see Fearon 1995). A
willingness to enter into an escalated fight might be sig-
naled via provocative or costly acts of aggression. A will-
ingness to permanently evict an individual might be sig-
naled by attacking or chasing the individual or excluding
it temporarily from the group (e.g., Mulder and Langmore
1993; Clutton-Brock et al. 1998). It is possible, therefore,
that much of the low-level aggression observed in animal
societies functions to support the credibility of threats of
more extreme action (such as departure, eviction, or es-
calated fighting). This hypothesis predicts that the level of
aggression will vary with the value of outside options to
the two players. By contrast, the hypothesis that aggression
is the means by which individuals negotiate or bargain
predicts that changing the value of outside options will
have no influence on aggression levels within the group.
Studies to add or remove outside options experimentally
(such as those of Langer et al. [2004] and Heg et al. [2006],
neither of which focuses on aggression) or to change the
expected payoff of all-out conflict would help to distin-
guish these hypotheses and so elucidate the function of
social aggression.
Studying threats empirically is challenging because the
most effective threats are those that rarely need to be ex-
ercised (e.g., consider the cost-effectiveness of a Mafia pro-
tection racket; Gambetta 1994) and because, by definition,
the only observed cooperative associations will be those
in which group members have avoided triggering group
breakup. Revealing latent threats in stable groups may
therefore require innovative experimental approaches to
disturb the status quo (e.g., Wright and Cuthill 1990; Reeve
and Nonacs 1992; Hinde 2006; Wong et al. 2007) or to
alter the payoffs of pursuing the outside option (e.g., Koe-
nig 1990; Langer et al. 2004; Cant et al. 2006; Heg et al.
2006). The potential reward is a much-improved under-
standing of the forces shaping individual behavior in co-
operative associations and the conditions for which such
associations can form.
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APPENDIX
Instability of Concessions in the Bordered Tug-of-War
Suppose that the subordinate in a group plays (Q, y). For any level of dominant competitive effort x, one can then
solve for the minimum concession sufficient to induce the subordinate to stay, denoted . Following Reeve andˆP(x)
Shen (2006), this value satisfies
by x
ˆ ˆ ˆG(1 x y) P(x) (1 P(x)Q)  rG(1 x y) Q (1 P(x)Q) p S rD, (A1)[ ] [ ]x by x by
where G is group productivity, b is the relative strength of the subordinate in a tug-of-war, r is genetic relatedness,
and S and D are the direct fitness payoffs of the subordinate and the dominant, respectively, if the subordinate chooses
to disperse. The left-hand side of equation (A1) gives the inclusive fitness payoff to the subordinate of remaining in
the group; the right-hand side gives the payoff if the subordinate chooses to leave. Equation (A1) yields, after some
rearrangement, the following expression for :ˆP(x)
rD(x by) S(x by) G(1 x y)[b(1Q)y r(x bQy)]
ˆP(x)p . (A2)
G(1 r)x(1 x y)
Note that , implying that the more strongly the dominant competes, the larger the minimum concession it′ˆP (x) 1 0
must provide (or, conversely, the less strongly the dominant competes, the smaller the concession it need supply).
In any evolutionarily stable association, the dominant must play a strategy of the form ( , x), because ifˆP(x) P !
, it is possible for the dominant to claim a larger share of reproduction without triggering subordinate departure,ˆP(x)
whereas if , the subordinate will leave. Consider, then, the payoff to a dominant that plays ( , x). Theˆ ˆP 1 P(x) P(x)
dominant’s inclusive fitness is given by
x by
ˆ ˆ ˆIp G(1 x y) Q (1 P(x)Q)  rG(1 x y) P(x) (1 P(x)Q) , (A3)[ ] [ ]x by x by
which, with equation (A2), yields
Ip rD S G(1 r)(1 x y). (A4)
It follows that
I
p G(1 r) ! 0, (A5)
x
implying that if x and are both positive, the dominant would always do better to reduce its competitive effortˆP(x)
and offer a correspondingly smaller concession. Intuitively, it makes little sense to offer your competitor a large free
concession P while simultaneously fighting hard over the contested fraction of reproduction. It is more efficient to
reduce the size of the concession and compete less strongly; in this way, the competitor’s outside option can be matched
(and hence group stability is maintained) at a lower cost to group productivity. An equivalent argument applies to
the subordinate (or whichever player is supposed to offer an incentive in the one-sided, bordered-tug-of-war model).
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